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Law teachers can enrich students’ experiences by incorporating transna-
tional perspectives into their course materials and classroom discussions. 
This contribution to Drexel Law Review’s Symposium—Building Global 
Professionalism: Emerging Trends in International and Transnational Le-
gal Education—explores four ways that teachers can integrate transna-
tional perspectives into classes on law and sexuality. First, teachers can 
situate U.S. law in the context of transnational norms. Second, by using 
foreign cultures as a foil, teachers can illuminate cultural constructs in the 
United States that influence the regulation of sexuality. Third, when dis-
cussing potential reform of U.S. law, classes can explore legal innovations 
developed in foreign jurisdictions. Fourth, classes can discuss transnational 
lawyering to prepare students who wish to pursue sexuality-related advo-
cacy abroad. 
INTRODUCTION 
It has become common for law schools in the United States to of-
fer classes on law and sexuality.1 These courses typically focus on is-
sues related to sexual orientation and gender identity. Sometimes, 
the courses take a wider view of sexuality, covering additional top-
- -  Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This Article is
based on remarks that I delivered at the Symposium entitled “Building Global Professional-
ism,” which was sponsored by the Drexel Law Review and Earle Mack School of Law’s Interna-
tional Law and Human Rights Society. I thank the organizers of the Symposium for executing 
a terrific event and I am especially grateful to Anil Kalhan and Jordan Fischer for their leader-
ship in planning the Symposium. I am also grateful to my research assistants, Kevin Schroeder 
and Katherine Slager, for their help in preparing this paper.
1. There are now several casebooks for courses on law and sexuality. See WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER & THE LAW (3d ed. 2012); SHANNON 
GILREATH & LYDIA E. LAVELLE, SEXUAL IDENTITY LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d 
ed. 2011); ARTHUR S. LEONARD & PATRICIA A. CAIN, SEXUALITY LAW (2d ed. 2009); WILLIAM B. 
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (3d ed. 
2008). The International Commission of Jurists, an organization in Geneva, has published a 
casebook dedicated to comparative law on sexual orientation and gender identity. INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY AND JUSTICE: A COM-
PARATIVE LAW CASEBOOK (2011). 
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ics such as prostitution and obscenity.2 This contribution to Drexel 
Law Review’s Symposium on globalization and legal education ex-
amines how teachers of law and sexuality can enrich students’ expe-
riences by incorporating transnational perspectives into their course 
materials and classroom discussions.3 
This Article encourages teachers of law and sexuality to integrate 
transnational perspectives into their classes, with the goal of inspir-
ing teachers to think about how transnational perspectives can en-
hance classes across the law school curriculum, not just classes with 
the words “international,” “comparative,” or “transnational” in 
their titles. Even when transnational dynamics are not the primary 
focus of a class, occasional discussion of transnational perspectives 
can enrich students’ learning experiences.4 The following discussion 
of law and sexuality provides examples of this effect. 
At the Symposium dedicated to this issue of the Drexel Law Re-
view, some attendees lamented that the globalization of law school 
curriculum has become siloed, with a limited number of students 
participating in stand-alone programs such as summer classes 
abroad and international human rights clinics.5 Other Symposium 
attendees expressed concerns about disequilibrium; they believe 
that U.S. law schools spend a great number of resources on expand-
ing their influence abroad, contributing to the export of ideas, while 
failing to spend comparable resources on importing and incorporat-
2. The second edition of the casebook by Professors Hunter and Eskridge addressed pros-
titution and obscenity in quite some detail. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 1. 
3. In this Article, the phrase “transnational perspectives” refers to perspectives that are ac-
quired by looking beyond one particular nation, either by comparing nations or by examining 
laws or norms that govern more than one nation. This definition of “transnational perspec-
tives” mirrors the way that law school classes on “transnational law” typically cover both 
comparative and international law. See Margaret Martin Berry, Practice Ready: Are We There 
Yet?, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 247, 259 (2012) (describing Washington & Lee University’s class 
entitled “Transnational Law”); Mathias Reimann, Taking Globalization Seriously: Michigan 
Breaks New Ground by Requiring the Study of Transnational Law, 82 MICH. B.J. 52, 52 (2003) (de-
scribing the University of Michigan’s class entitled “Transnational Law”). 
4. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Two Approaches to Internationalizing the Curriculum: Some 
Comments, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 805, 806 (2006) (“Upper-class courses can (and should) al-
so contain comparative and international perspectives, and in some areas, such as corpora-
tions, antitrust, or intellectual property, limiting the syllabus strictly to domestic materials 
borders on educational malpractice under modern conditions.”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Incorpo-
rating Transnational Materials into Traditional Courses, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 813, 814 (2006) 
(promoting the integration of transnational perspectives into “traditional domestically-
oriented core courses—such as Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Corporations, 
Criminal Law and Procedure, Torts, and Property”). 
5. See Drexel Law Review, Models of Internationalization, INT’L L. SYMP. 0:30:00–2:30:00 (Oct. 
12, 2012), http://media.irt.drexel.edu/Mediasite/Play/bfc59761fdaf40c1b21b9ef74a116c861d. 
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ing foreign perspectives into classes at home.6 This Article addresses 
these concerns and argues that examining transnational perspectives 
in classes such as law and sexuality helps to reduce siloing and ex-
poses students to ideas from abroad. 
The remainder of this Article will explore four ways to incorpo-
rate transnational perspectives into classes on law and sexuality. 
First, teachers can situate U.S. law in the context of transnational 
norms.7 Second, by using foreign cultures as a foil, teachers can il-
luminate cultural constructs in the United States that influence the 
regulation of sexuality.8 Third, when discussing potential reform of 
U.S. law, classes can explore legal innovations developed in foreign 
jurisdictions.9 And, fourth, classes can examine transnational law-
yering to prepare students who wish to pursue sexuality-related ad-
vocacy abroad.10 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that this Article does not 
prescribe precisely how much time teachers should invest in trans-
national components of class. Teachers should allocate time differ-
ently based on factors such as their students’ expressed interests and 
the credit load of each course. For deep exploration of transnational 
perspectives, teachers can assign relevant reading materials for 
lengthy discussions. Other teachers might choose to raise transna-
tional perspectives more casually during class and point interested 
students to reading materials that are optional. At a minimum, 
teachers should give serious consideration to the benefits of transna-
tional perspectives when designing courses on sexuality and the 
law. 
I. TRANSNATIONAL  NORMS
Perhaps the most obvious way to inject transnational perspectives 
into classes is to examine whether the United States conforms to 
transnational norms. To some readers, incorporating these discus-
sions into classes on law and sexuality will seem intuitive because of 
Lawrence v. Texas, the landmark Supreme Court case that struck 
down a ban on same-sex sodomy.11 Lawrence overruled the earlier 
6. Id. 
7. See infra Part I. 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. See infra Part III. 
10. See infra Part IV. 
11. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that a state sodomy prohibition violated constitu-
tional protection of substantive due process). 
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case of Bowers v. Hardwick and paved the way for expanding sexuali-
ty rights over the past decade.12 In Bowers, Chief Justice Burger’s 
concurring opinion legitimized sodomy bans by invoking transna-
tional norms.13 He claimed that, throughout history, sodomy had 
been condemned in Western civilization.14 Writing for the majority 
in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy countered Chief Justice Burger’s ac-
count of norms by citing foreign laws to show that sodomy has, in 
fact, not been universally condemned.15 Quite to the contrary, many 
Western parts of the world affirmatively protect the rights of adults 
to engage in consensual sexual activity with partners of the same 
sex.16 
Because Lawrence is so fundamental to classes on law and sexuali-
ty, it is usually taught early in the semester. It thus provides an early 
opportunity to engage students in an introductory discussion about 
comparative law. Justice Kennedy’s references to foreign law in 
Lawrence elicited harsh criticisms from Justice Scalia in his dissenting 
opinion.17 In the wake of Lawrence, commentators produced a great 
deal of literature on the arguments for and against judicial citations 
to foreign law.18 Commentators examined whether transnational 
norms are particularly relevant to specific types of legal disputes.19 
12. See id. at 578, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
13. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196–97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
14. See id. at 196 (“Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been sub-
ject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization.”). 
15. Justice Kennedy cited British law, case law from the European Court of Human Rights, 
and an amicus brief that surveyed laws from different parts of the world. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
572–73, 576–77. 
16. Id. at 576–77. Although Justice Kennedy was responding to Chief Justice Burger’s claim 
about “Western civilization,” it is worth noting that laws in many non-Western parts of the 
world also support the freedom of adults to engage in consensual sodomy. See Holning Lau, 
Grounding Conversations on Sexuality and Asian Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 777–78 (2011) 
(discussing Asian countries that either have never criminalized sodomy or had repealed sod-
omy laws by the time of Lawrence). 
17. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s discussion 
of foreign law constituted “[d]angerous dicta,” and the Court “should not impose foreign 
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans”) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)). 
18. See Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity: American Law in Light of East 
Asian Developments, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 69 n.9 (2008) (providing a list of articles that 
discuss judicial citation of foreign sources). 
19. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 125 (2005) (“[T]he legitimacy of looking to foreign experience will vary 
with the issue, depending on the specificity and history of our constitutional text . . . .”); see al-
so Jessica R. Feierman & Riya S. Shah, Protecting Personhood: Legal Strategies to Combat the Use of 
Strip Searches on Youth in Detention, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 67, 86 (2007) (contending that “Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence lends itself to the integrated use of foreign precedent” and agree-
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They also explored different ways that foreign laws might matter. 
For example, some commentators believe that, regardless of wheth-
er transnational trends have inherent normative value, it is appro-
priate for courts to cite foreign judicial opinions for their underlying 
logic or for empirical evidence.20 
Introducing students to the jurisprudential debates that Lawrence 
generated will help them to understand how foreign legal develop-
ments may or may not influence future decisions about sexuality 
rights. Students should also be made aware that these debates about 
citing foreign laws have centered on the role of courts. Even critics 
of courts’ engagement with foreign laws generally concede that de-
velopments beyond U.S. borders can inform deliberations in the 
United States that take place in legislative bodies and in broader 
public discourse.21 
Previously, I have argued that the “United States should not 
blindly follow norms that emerge among its peers; however, if the 
United States falls out of line with its peers, that deviation should be 
cause for critical questioning,” prompting greater public scrutiny of 
the rationales that underlie U.S. laws.22 In this view, it is worth not-
ing some emerging transnational norms, such as growing support 
ing with scholars who have “argued that Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is equally re-
ceptive to foreign law”). 
20. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Debate, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opin-
ion, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 421, 425 (2004) (“[B]y looking to foreign sources, we can get 
empirical evidence about how a prospective legal rule operates in practice.”); Panel Discus-
sion, Citation to Foreign Decisions in Constitutional Adjudication, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 135, 138 
(2009) (quoting Eric Blumenson, who remarked that “[t]here is another use of foreign law that 
I believe is wholly legitimate, and quite distant from the concerns of the critics: looking to for-
eign opinions as a source of empirical data.”); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign 
Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 666–68, 670–71, 676–77 
(2009) (arguing that, although there are some problematic uses of foreign law, citing foreign 
law for “logical reinforcement” is generally acceptable and citing foreign law for either “em-
pirical consequences” or “persuasive reasoning” is, when executed properly, acceptable as 
well). 
21. See, e.g., Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring) (“While Congress, as a legis-
lature, may wish to consider the actions of other nations on any issue it likes, this Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on 
Americans.”), quoted in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
22. Lau, supra note 18, at 78. Sujit Choudhry has also addressed this issue, noting that:
the study of comparative law ‘encourages the student to be more critical about the 
functions and purposes of the rules he is studying and to learn not to accept their va-
lidity  purely because they belong to his own system of law.’ . . . [C]omparative juris-
prudence can be an important stimulus to legal self-reflection. 
Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 835–36 (1999) (quoting PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE 
LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 18 (1995)). 
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for the right to be free from sexual orientation discrimination and 
the right of transgender individuals to be legally recognized in their 
acquired sex.23 Laws in the United States often fail to comport with 
these patterns.24 
II. CULTURAL  CONSTRUCTS
Classes on law and sexuality usually include discussions about 
whether aspects of sexuality are culturally constructed. Most stu-
dents readily recognize that some beliefs previously held to be facts 
of nature are now widely regarded as cultural constructs. In the 
23. For more on protections against sexual orientation discrimination, see Aaron Xavier 
Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Human Rights Law and Theory, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 797, 831–32 (2008) (explaining that “a growing number [of national and provin-
cial governments] now unilaterally prohibit discrimination against sexual minorities compre-
hensively, including in government action and services, housing and real estate, employment, 
education, and public accommodations such as the provision of goods and services.”). Re-
garding transgender recognition, consider the pending litigation in the Hong Kong case of W 
v. Registrar of Marriage. Although the Court of Appeal decided that the transgender woman in 
the case did not have a right to be recognized as a woman for the purposes of marriage, the 
court noted: 
Internationally, there is a strong trend toward recognition of an individual’s new 
gender by changing the gender indicated on birth certificates and other identity doc-
uments. The change of official identity documents is closely linked, in turn, with an 
individual’s ability to marry a now opposite sex partner. . . . [M]ost Asian countries 
permit a transgender individual to marry in his or her acquired gender or have 
erected no legal barrier. 
W v. Registrar of Marriages, [2011] 1 H.K.C. 442, ¶¶ 148–49 (C.A.) (quoting an amicus brief 
submitted by the International Commission of Jurists); see also Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 
35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2002) (holding that the European Convention on Human Rights protects 
the rights of transgender individuals to marry in their acquired sex). The case of W is now 
pending before the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong. See W v. Registrar of Marriages, 
[2012] H.K.C. 105, ¶¶ 4, 7 (C.A.) (granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal). 
24. Advocates in the United States have pushed for federal legislation that would ban em-
ployment discrimination based on sexual orientation, but Congress has not passed such legis-
lation. See Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination 
Against LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for 
Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 715–16 (2012). Only 21 states currently 
prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. at 755. With respect to 
transgender rights, consider the fact that courts in the United States have divided on whether 
transgender individuals have a right to be recognized in their acquired sex for the purposes of 
marriage. Compare M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 210–11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (recogniz-
ing the right of transgender individuals to marry in their acquired sex), with In re Marriage of 
Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (invalidating the marriage of a transsexual 
male to a female as a same-sex marriage). Of course, legalizing same-sex marriage renders it 
unnecessary to determine whether a transgender person is male or female for the purposes of 
marriage. Currently, eleven states and the District of Columbia issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples. See Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-sex Marriage Laws, 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/ 
same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last updated May 15, 2013). 
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1873 case of Bradwell v. Illinois, the Supreme Court allowed Illinois to 
forbid Myra Bradwell from practicing law because she was a wom-
an.25 Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion supported the Court’s de-
cision by noting the “natural and proper timidity and delicacy” of 
women.26 The Supreme Court has since rejected Bradley’s sugges-
tion that women are naturally timid and delicate.27 Similarly, most 
students now recognize that culture plays a role in shaping social 
views about women, including the view that women are timid and 
delicate. 
Myra Bradwell’s case illustrates that entrenched cultural views 
can be mistaken for natural facts. Bradwell, however, is an old exam-
ple. Students sometimes find it difficult to shift the focus from past 
to present and think critically about the extent to which society still 
mistakenly perceives cultural ideas about sexuality as facts of na-
ture. Looking abroad helps to illuminate the role that culture con-
tinues to play. This is because foreign cultures can serve as a foil, il-
luminating culture in the United States. 
The sex binary is a cultural construct that still dominates thinking 
in the United States.28 It is common to think that all human beings 
belong to one of two sex categories, male or female, in a way that is 
fixed at birth.29 Commentators have argued that this classification 
scheme is not ordained by nature, but instead, is a product of cul-
ture.30 For some students, this argument can be difficult to grasp at 
first, but introducing students to law and culture outside the United 
States can help to illustrate the claim. For example, the highest 
courts of both Nepal and Pakistan have held that individuals have a 
constitutional right to be recognized as a third sex and that members 
of the third sex have rights against discrimination.31 Although these 
25. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872). 
26. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
27. For example, in United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court rejected “fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females” and “overbroad generalizations about 
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.” 518 U.S. 515, 533, 541 
(1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). 
28. See, e.g., Paisley Currah, Defending Genders: Sex and Gender Non-Conformity in the Civil 
Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1363, 1371 (1999) (noting the “common 
sense” belief that “biological sex is immutable, is limited to two categories, and is determined 
by the body”). 
29. Id. 
30. See Jessica Knouse, Intersexuality and the Social Construction of Anatomical Sex, 12 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 135, 136 (2005); Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: 
Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 
11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 278–84 (2005). 
31. For more on Nepal, see 2 NJA L.J. 261, 268, 275–78, 280 (2008), available at
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legal developments in Nepal and Pakistan are relatively new, there 
is a long cultural history of recognizing more than two sex catego-
ries in South Asia.32 Beyond South Asia, Australia has also begun of-
fering a third sex option on passports for intersex individuals.33 
Examples from outside of the United States help students to see 
that binary sex categories are not adhered to universally. Differences 
between sex classification systems in the United States and in other 
parts of the world suggest that sex categories are shaped, at least in 
part, by local culture. In introducing students to classification sys-
tems from abroad, I do not mean to propose that the United States 
adopt the foreign systems. Rather, I use examples from abroad to il-
lustrate the cultural contingency of sex categories. Recognizing that 
sex categories are cultural constructs sheds light on current policy 
proposals. Most rights activists in the United States have not been 
seeking legal recognition of a third sex.34 Rather, they advocate 
granting individuals more liberty to choose whether to identify as 
male or female.35 Recognizing that sex categories are cultural con-
 
http://njanepal.org.np/index.php?option=com_rokdownloads&view=folder&Itemid=157 
(translating Pant et al. v. Nepal, Writ No. 917, Dec. 21, 2007). With regard to Pakistan, see Kha-
lid Aziz, SC Directs Govt to Support Eunuchs Financially, THE NATION, July 15, 2009, 
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/islamabad 
/15-Jul-2009/SC-directs-govt-to-support-eunuchs-financially; Mark Magnier, A Small Victory 
for Pakistan’s Transgenders, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/ 
mar/03/world/la-fg-pakistan-transgender3-2010mar03. 
32. Although the third sex has been stigmatized in South Asia, it is recognized as a sex cat-
egory nonetheless. See, e.g., Serena Nanda, Hijras: An Alternative Sex and Gender Role in India, in 
THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER: BEYOND SEXUAL DIMORPHISM IN CULTURE AND HISTORY 373, 373–
418 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1996) (describing the recognition of a third sex within various cultural 
and religious traditions in India). 
33. Zosia Bielski, Australians Have Third Option for Gender on Passports, THE GLOBE AND 
MAIL (Canada), Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/travel/travel-news/ 
australians-have-third-option-for-gender-on-passports/article544980/. For an Australian or-
ganization’s argument that eliminating sex categories would be better than creating a third 
category, see Gina Wilson, Third Gender? No Thanks, Says Australian Intersex Organization, GAY 
STAR NEWS, July 12, 2012, http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/third-gender-no-thanks-
says-australian-intersex-organization120712. 
34. See Alice D. Dreger & April M. Herndon, Progress and Politics in the Intersex Rights 
Movement: Feminist Theory in Action, 15 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 199, 217 (2009) (noting 
the positions of intersex organizations including the Intersex Society of North America, the 
DSD Consortium, and Bodies Like Ours). 
35. For example, intersex rights advocates argue that intersex individuals should not be 
subjected to so-called corrective surgeries when they are children, so that they have the liberty 
to define their own sex identifications when they are old enough to do so. See Noa Ben-Asher, 
The Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex and Transsex Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GEN-
DER 51, 62 (2006). Rights advocates likewise seek greater liberty for transgender individuals by 
advocating for policies that make transitioning from one sex to another more accessible. See, 
e.g., id. at 55–60, 96 (describing litigation seeking insurance coverage of sex reassignment sur-
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structs supports these claims by reminding us that rules regarding 
classification are not set rigidly by nature. 
Classes on law and sexuality typically also discuss the cultural 
construction of gay identity. Individuals who are sexually intimate 
with members of the same sex do not always form identities around 
that conduct by claiming labels such as “gay,” “lesbian,” or “bisexu-
al.”36 Students can learn about the historical development of gay 
identity in the West by reading the writings of scholars such as John 
D’Emilio and Michel Foucault.37 In some parts of the world, thinking 
about homosexuality in terms of identity is a more recent cultural 
development than it is in the West. For example, ethnographers 
have suggested that, until the past decade or so, individuals in Iran 
who engaged in same-sex intimacy almost never identified them-
selves as gay, homosexual, or members of any such identity catego-
ry.38 Exploring such recent examples puts in stark relief the cultural 
contingency of gay identity. 
In other places, such as Nepal, sexual identity categories are much 
more nuanced than the categories “lesbian,” “gay,” “bisexual,” and 
“transgender.” Some identity categories in Nepal simultaneously 
convey an individual’s sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, and 
preferred role in intimacy.39 As the Nepalese advocacy group Blue 
Diamond Society put it, sexual minorities in Nepal include “Meti, 
Ta, Dohori, Singaru, Maruni, Strain, Kothi, Fulumulu, Lesbian 
women, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender men and women, Hijras and 
many more.”40 Societies abroad, such as Nepal and Iran, serve as 
geries); Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Alaska Lt. Governor Files Regulation For 
Changing Driver’s Licenses (July 26, 2012) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/alaska-lt-governor-files-regulation-changing-drivers-licenses 
(arguing that surgery should not be a requirement for transgender individuals to change the 
sex designation on their drivers’ licenses and lauding the State of Alaska for eliminating the 
surgical requirement). 
36. See EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL 
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 299 fig.8.2 (1994) (illustrating that sexual desire, behavior, 
and identity are not coextensive). 
37. JOHN D'EMILIO, MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS AND THE UNIVER-
SITY (1992); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon 
Books 1978) (1976). 
38. See, e.g., Pardis Mahdavi, Questioning the Global Gays(ze): Constructions of Sexual Identi-
ties in Post-Revolution Iran, 18 SOC. IDENTITIES 223, 225–31 (2012) (presenting ethnographic 
fieldwork conducted in Iran between 2000 and 2007). 
39. SUNIL BABU PANT, BLUE DIAMOND SOC’Y, SOCIAL EXCLUSION OF SEXUAL AND GENDER 
MINORITIES: FINAL REPORT 7, 7–8, 39 (2005), available at http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/ 
sexualminorities/NepalBDSreport05.pdf. 
40. Id. at 39. Some of these categories overlap. See id. at 7–8. 
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foils, illuminating the role that culture plays in shaping categories of 
sexual identity in the United States. 
Recognizing that gay identity is a cultural construct has implica-
tions for legal advocacy. U.S.-trained lawyers who advocate for sex-
uality rights abroad must familiarize themselves with local concep-
tualizations of identity in order to be culturally competent. Within 
the United States, some commentators have criticized gay identity 
politics, arguing that progressive advocacy should not reify gay 
identity and instead should reduce the social salience of gay identity 
because pigeonholing people into identity categories is stifling.41 
Recognizing that gay identity is a cultural construct helps one to see 
that reducing the salience of gay identity is possible because cultural 
constructs are susceptible to change. 
III. LABORATORIES  OF  INNOVATION
Classes on law and sexuality usually discuss not only existing 
black-letter law, but also potential law reform. Exploring experienc-
es from abroad enriches conversations about law reform because 
foreign jurisdictions have experimented with innovative approaches 
to legal issues.42 These foreign approaches warrant attention, but not 
necessarily because they have become a transnational norm that the 
United States should follow for the sake of norm compliance. Ra-
ther, the United States ought to consider foreign innovations be-
cause the reasoning that underlies novel foreign approaches might 
be persuasive or might help us to appreciate the approaches that we 
have developed in the United States. 
Examining foreign ideas can enhance conversations about several 
topics in the law and sexuality curriculum. In the context of consti-
tutional law, for example, students of law and sexuality grapple 
41. For critiques of gay identity politics, see, for example, Mary Bernstein, Identity Politics, 
31 ANN. REV. SOC. 47, 56 (2005); Joshua Gamson, Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct?: A 
Queer Dilemma, in QUEER THEORY 395, 409–11 (Steven Seidman ed., 1996); Judith Butler, Imita-
tion and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13, 27–29 (Di-
ana Fuss ed., 1991). Of course, there is also significant commentary recognizing that gay iden-
tity politics has been a powerful tool for social change. See, e.g., Gamson, supra, at 396 (discuss-
ing gay identity politics in the United States); Mahdavi, supra note 38, at 231–34 (describing 
interview subjects’ views that the development of gay identity politics in Iran has been em-
powering). 
42. “Just as our states are laboratories for social experiments from which other states and 
the federal government can learn, so are foreign nations laboratories from whose legal exper-
iments we can learn.” Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., 
July–Aug. 2004, at 38, 42 (arguing that policymakers in the United States can learn from for-
eign experiences, but courts in the United States should not cite foreign law as authority). 
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with determining what standard of review should be applied to 
equal protection claims concerning sexual orientation.43 Courts in 
the United States disagree on whether laws that treat people differ-
ently based on sexual orientation should trigger strict scrutiny, in-
termediate scrutiny, or rational basis review.44 Other countries, 
however, have not followed the United States in creating these dif-
ferent levels of review. Some judges and academic commentators 
believe that the United States should jettison its tiered approach to 
equal protection.45 When considering those critiques, it could be 
helpful to explore whether the proportionality test that many for-
eign jurisdictions apply in equal protection cases is a desirable re-
placement for any or all of the tiers of review that the United States 
currently employs.46 Same-sex marriage cases from Canada provide 
an example of how the proportionality test can be applied to cases of 
sexual orientation discrimination.47 
43. For background on the United States’ tiered approach to equal protection, see, e.g., 
James E. Fleming, “There’s Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s 
Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2304–10 (2006); Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 494–518 (2004). 
44. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying intermedi-
ate scrutiny); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9–11 (1st Cir. 
2012) (applying rational basis review); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435–40 (Cal. 2008) 
(applying strict scrutiny). As I write this Article, two same-sex marriage cases are pending be-
fore the Supreme Court. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 786 (2012) (mem.) (granting 
certiorari); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 786 (2012) (mem.) (granting certiorari). In these 
cases, the Court might announce the standard of review for laws that discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation. The Court might, however, avoid the merits of the cases by deciding 
them on procedural grounds. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Article III Double-Dipping: Proposition 
8’s Sponsors, BLAG, and the Government’s Interest, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 164, 164 
(2013) (discussing the standing question in both cases). 
45. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); San Anto-
nio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Goldberg, 
supra note 43, at 518–27. 
46. For information on the proportionality test adopted by many foreign jurisdictions, see 
Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the 
Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 799, 802–06 (2011). Mathews and Sweet note: 
In contrast to the United States, constitutional courts in legal systems around the 
world have converged on a method for adjudicating rights claims—proportionality 
analysis (PA)—an analytical procedure with balancing at its core. In the past half-
century, PA has become a centerpiece of jurisprudence across the European conti-
nent, as well as in common law systems as diverse as Canada, South Africa, Israel, 
and the United Kingdom. 
Id. at 799. 
47. See, e.g., Halpern v. Canada, (2003) 65 O.R. 3d 161 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Barbeau v. British 
Columbia, 2003 BCCA 406 (Can.). In previous writing, I have described how case law from 
Hong Kong has applied the proportionality approach to sexual orientation discrimination. See 
Lau, supra note 18, at 80–85. 
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Looking abroad can also prompt students to think more 
carefully about proposals to reform sex classification policies in the 
United States. As mentioned earlier, some foreign jurisdictions dif-
fer from the United States because they recognize more than two sex 
categories.48 The number of categories, however, is not the only way 
in which foreign jurisdictions differ. If someone wants to change her 
legal sex in the United States, a medical diagnosis of Gender Identity 
Disorder or Gender Dysphoria is usually required, and, in most cas-
es, surgery of some sort is required as well.49 Advocates in the Unit-
ed States have argued that these requirements are too burdensome.50 
When considering critiques of medical requirements, it is helpful to 
examine foreign regimes such as the United Kingdom, Spain, and 
Argentina. The United Kingdom and Spain have enacted national 
legislation that allows individuals to change their sex for all legal 
purposes without having to undergo any surgical procedures.51 Ar-
gentina has relaxed requirements further by defining legal sex en-
tirely by self-determination, not requiring any medical diagnosis.52 
Sexual harassment is another relevant topic. In the United States, 
an employee can win a sexual harassment lawsuit only if he or she 
successfully argues that the harassment was discriminatory.53 As a 
48. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
49. Gender reclassification policies in the United States almost always require individuals 
to undergo surgery. See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 736–37 (2008) 
(providing background on gender reclassification policies). Some reclassification policies re-
quire evidence of medical intervention, but not necessarily surgical intervention. See id. at 736; 
Amy Ballard, Comment, Sex Change: Changing the Face of Transgender Policy in the United States, 
18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 775, 788–89 (2012) (explaining that the United States Department 
of State no longer requires surgical intervention for gender reclassification on passports). In 
very limited contexts, the government will classify individuals based solely on individuals’ 
self-identification. For example, some cities in the United States have homeless shelter place-
ment policies that classify individuals based entirely on self-identification. Spade, supra, at 
736–37. 
50. For criticism of surgical requirements, see, for example, Ballard, supra note 49, at 796–
98. For broader criticism of the medicalization of gender identity, see Alvin Lee, Note, Trans 
Models in Prison: The Medicalization of Gender Identity and the Eighth Amendment Right to Sex Re-
assignment Therapy, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 447, 457–59 (2008) (creating a typology of criti-
cisms against the medicalization of gender identity).
51. See Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c.7 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation 
.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/7/pdfs/ukpga_20040007_en.pdf. For commentary on the United King-
dom’s Gender Recognition Act, see generally Andrew N. Sharpe, Gender Recognition in the UK: 
A Great Leap Forward, 18 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 241 (2009). For discussion of the Spanish legisla-
tion, see Raquel (Lucas) Platero, The Narratives of Transgender Rights Mobilization in Spain, 14 
SEXUALITIES 597, 599, 601 (2011) (describing Spanish Law 3/2007, B.O.E. 2007, 65, p.11251). 
52. Emily Schmall, Transgender Advocates Applaud New Law in Argentina: Far-Reaching 
Measure Is One of World’s Most Liberal on Changing Sex, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 26, 2012, at 6. 
53. See, for example, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986), the landmark case 
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result, some defendants have avoided liability by convincing courts 
that they are “equal opportunity” sexual harassers who are indis-
criminately offensive.54 In class discussions that critique existing 
law, students benefit from exploring foreign approaches to sexual 
harassment that are not based exclusively on antidiscrimination 
principles. During my first year of teaching law and sexuality, an 
LLM student from Israel gave me Israel’s sexual harassment statute 
to share with the class, and, many years later, I still share the Israeli 
law with my students.55 In Israel and in other parts of the world, 
laws prohibit sexual harassment even when the harassment is not 
discriminatory.56 
Foreign jurisdictions have also served as policy laboratories with 
respect to prostitution. Looking beyond the United States allows 
students to consider Sweden’s approach, which criminalizes the 
buying of sex, but not the selling of it.57 Students might also consider 
the laws of New Zealand, which are considered to be among the 
world’s most liberal in terms of decriminalizing prostitution.58 To be 
sure, none of the policy discussions mentioned so far require look-
ing beyond the United States. For example, students can certainly 
examine the pros and cons of decriminalizing prostitution by ex-
ploring competing theories about decriminalization and by examin-
ing Nevada’s limited experience with legalizing brothels.59 Looking 
abroad, however, enriches discussions by leading us to additional 
concrete examples for consideration. Similarly, foreign jurisdictions 
provide concrete examples for the topics examined earlier in this 
in which the U.S. Supreme Court accepted that sexual harassment is sometimes a form of sex 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
54. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Title VII does not cover 
the ‘equal opportunity’ or ‘bisexual’ harasser . . . because such a person is not discriminating on 
the basis of sex. He is not treating one sex better (or worse) than the other; he is treating both 
sexes the same (albeit badly).”) (citation omitted). 
55. See Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 5758–1998, SH No. 1661 (Isr.).
56. Id. § 1 (“The purpose of this law is to prohibit sexual harassment in order to protect 
human dignity, liberty and privacy and in order to promote equality between the sexes.”); see 
also Noya Rimalt, Stereotyping Women, Individualizing Harassment: The Dignitary Paradigm of 
Sexual Harassment Law Between the Limits of Law and the Limits of Feminism, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMI-
NISM 391, 446–47 (2008) (critiquing the Israeli sexual harassment law). 
57. For a list of literature discussing the Swedish approach to prostitution, see Barbara 
Havelková, Using Gender Equality Analysis to Improve the Wellbeing of Prostitutes, 18 CARDOZO 
J.L. & GENDER 55, 59 n.18 (2011).
58. See NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT, REPORT OF THE PROSTITUTION LAW REVIEW COMMIT-
TEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE PROSTITUTION REFORM ACT 2003, 22–23 (2008). 
59. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.354(1) (2009) (making it unlawful to engage in prostitution 
“except in a licensed house of prostitution”). 
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section—constitutional standards of review,60 sex classification poli-
cies,61 and sexual harassment law.62 These are some of the many dif-
ferent areas in which foreign jurisdictions have been policy innova-
tors. 
IV. TRANSNATIONAL  LAWYERING
Transnational perspectives are important not only because they 
enhance our understanding of law and policy in the United States. 
They are also important because lawyers trained in the United 
States can, and do, work on sexuality-related advocacy abroad. To 
prepare students for this possibility, it is important to equip them 
with pertinent legal knowledge and understandings about the cul-
tural dynamics that complicate transnational lawyering. 
To start, teachers should introduce students to the international 
and regional human rights systems that influence sexuality rights in 
many parts of the world. Although the United Nations’ treaty bod-
ies are not very influential over the United States, they hold sway 
elsewhere. For example, the United Nations Human Rights Commit-
tee’s landmark decision in Toonen v. Australia played an important 
role in bringing about the decriminalization of same-sex sodomy in 
Tasmania, Australia.63 Although the major international human 
rights treaties do not explicitly mention sexual orientation, the Unit-
ed Nations bodies tasked with treaty interpretation have stated that 
treaty provisions protecting equality, privacy, and other human 
rights subsume the protection of sexual orientation rights.64 Indeed, 
the United Nations treaty bodies have developed a significant cor-
pus of jurisprudence protecting sexual orientation rights.65 Beyond 
60. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
63. See Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 488/1992, Toonen v. Australia, 50th Sess., 
Mar. 31, 1994, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Apr. 4, 1994), available at http://www 
.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/d22a00bcd1320c9c80256724005e60d5; Carl F. Stychin, Same-Sex 
Sexualities and the Globalization of Human Rights Discourse, 49 MCGILL L.J. 951, 956–60 (2004) 
(discussing the impact of Toonen in Australia). 
64. See Michael O’Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM RTS. L. REV. 207, 214–
25 (2008). 
65. See id. See generally INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDEN-
TITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: REFERENCES TO JURISPRUDENCE AND DOCTRINE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM (4th ed. 2010), available at http://www.asiapacificforum.net/ 
support/issues/acj/references/sexual-orientation/downloads/Jurisprudence_and 
_Doctrine_of_UN_Human_Rights_System.pdf/view (providing “a comprehensive collection 
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the United Nations, independent human rights experts convened 
and codified the Yogyakarta Principles, which purport to clarify 
how international human rights treaties protect sexual orientation 
and gender identity rights.66 
In addition to the international human rights system, regional 
human rights systems influence sexuality rights as well. Teachers 
may wish to provide students with background about the Inter-
American Human Rights System and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’ landmark 2012 decision in Atala v. Chile, in which 
the Court recognized sexual orientation rights for the first time.67 
The Court condemned Chile for withholding child custody rights 
from a woman because she was lesbian.68 
Students are usually interested in also learning about the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which has become influential 
around the world, not just within Europe.69 Courts outside of Eu-
rope—including the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas—have 
cited the ECHR as persuasive authority.70 In this light, teaching stu-
dents about the ECHR is relevant not only to lawyering in Europe, 
but to transnational lawyering more generally. A case that gives 
students a nice look at how the ECHR operates is Schalk & Kopf v. 
Austria, which held that Austria did not violate the European Con-
vention on Human Rights by denying same-sex couples the right to 
marry.71 Schalk & Kopf introduces students to two of the ECHR’s 
most important doctrinal features: the consensus and margin of ap-
preciation doctrines, both of which the ECHR invoked to affirm 
Austria’s refusal of same-sex marriage rights.72 
of jurisprudence, general comments, concluding observations, and reports” on sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity). 
66. See O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 64, at 232–37. 
67. Atala v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 239, ¶ 111 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
68. Id. ¶¶ 109–17. 
69. See John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur’s Overview and Conclusions: Of Sovereignty, Globaliza-
tion, and Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 16 (1995) (“The ECHR may be becoming a sort 
of world court of human rights.”). 
70. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576 (2003).
71. Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 24–25, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe 
.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-99605. 
72. See id. at 21, 22–23 (invoking the doctrines of consensus and margin of appreciation). In 
previous writing, I have critiqued the ECHR’s application of the consensus and margin of ap-
preciation doctrines in Schalk & Kopf. See Holning Lau, Rewriting Schalk and Kopf: Shifting the 
Locus of Deference, in DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING JUDGMENTS OF THE 
ECHR 243–64 (Eva Brems ed., 2013). For background on the ECHR’s consensus and margin of 
appreciation doctrines, see Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Conven-
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Because the ECHR struck down a sodomy law more than two 
decades before the U.S. Supreme Court did so in Lawrence,73 some 
students come into class thinking that the ECHR is an extremely 
progressive court. Discussing Schalk & Kopf complicates that view by 
showing students that the consensus and margin of appreciation 
doctrines limit how far the ECHR is willing to go to protect rights.74 
Beyond studying international and regional human rights law, 
students benefit from examining the debate about whether human 
rights are universal or culturally relative.75 Female genital cutting 
and gay rights are two topics that illuminate this debate. Cultural 
relativists argue that female genital cutting is a local cultural prac-
tice that warrants protection.76 In this view, international human 
rights organizations that campaign against female genital cutting 
are imposing foreign norms upon local cultural groups.77 
Allegations of cultural imperialism also arise in the gay rights 
context. Indeed, the gay rights context is particularly interesting be-
cause both proponents and opponents of gay rights invoke Western 
imperialism in their advocacy. For example, opponents of decrimi-
nalizing sodomy in Uganda have argued that decriminalization 
would amount to an imposition of Western norms;78 meanwhile, 
tion on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, 135–40 (1993); Eva Brems, The Margin of Ap-
preciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L.] 240, 240–56 
(1996) (Ger.); George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 705, 705–15, 724–29 (2006). 
73. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 19–20 (1981) (holding that the United 
Kingdom’s criminalization of sodomy violated the European Convention on Human Rights). 
74. For criticisms of the ways that the doctrines of consensus and margin of appreciation 
limit the ECHR’s protection of human rights, see Ivana Radačić, The Margin of Appreciation, 
Consensus, Morality and the Rights of the Vulnerable Groups, 31 ZBORNIK PRAVNOG FAKULTETA 
SVEUČILIŠTA U RIJECI [COLLECTED PAPERS OF THE L. FAC. OF THE U. OF RIJEKA] 599, 601–04 
(2010) (Croat.). See also Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Stand-
ards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 850–52 (1999). 
75. For background on the debate about universalism and cultural relativism, see HENRY J. 
STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 517–39 
(3d ed., 2007). 
76. See generally Michelle Goldberg, Rights Versus Rites, 20 AM. PROSPECT 46 (2009) (de-
scribing and critiquing relativist defenses of female genital cutting). 
77. See id. A milder but related criticism is that, even if one accepts that female genital cut-
ting should be condemned, human rights lawyers from the United States have focused exces-
sive amounts of attention on female genital cutting due to cultural biases. See, e.g., Yael Tamir, 
Hands Off Clitoridectomy, 21 BOSTON REV. (1996), available at http://www.bostonreview.net/ 
BR21.3/Tamir.html. For additional background on cultural relativism as it relates to women’s 
rights, see generally Tracy Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 89 (1996). 
78. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY: THE ORIGINS OF “SODOMY” LAWS IN 
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proponents of decriminalization have pointed to the fact that the 
sodomy laws were implemented by British colonial powers in the 
first place.79 Students who are interested in the globalization of sex-
uality rights benefit greatly from examining how these specters of 
cultural imperialism arise in debates about law reform projects 
around the world. Students interested in international human rights 
ought to be mindful of these difficult cultural dynamics. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that incorporating transnational perspec-
tives into classes on law and sexuality can greatly enhance students’ 
experiences. Moreover, this Article has described four ways that 
teachers of law and sexuality can integrate transnational perspec-
tives into their classes. First, teachers can help students understand 
how U.S. law fits within the context of transnational norms. Second, 
by using foreign cultures as a foil, teachers can illuminate cultural 
constructs in the United States that shape laws concerning sexuality. 
Third, classes can explore legal innovations developed in foreign ju-
risdictions and examine what the United States might learn from 
such innovations. And, fourth, classes can help prepare students to 
pursue advocacy abroad. 
BRITISH COLONIALISM 3 (2008). 
79. Human Rights Watch has detailed the British colonial origin of sodomy prohibitions in 
many parts of the world, such as Uganda. See id. at 53–62. Human Rights Watch has shined a 
light on the colonial origins of sodomy laws to problematize the claim that rejecting gay rights 
is a rebuke of the West; however, Human Rights Watch’s main arguments for decriminalizing 
sodomy are based not on the laws’ British origins, but on the laws’ effects on human dignity. 
See id. at 52–62. I have written another article arguing this is the proper approach; laws are not 
inherently problematic simply because they can be traced to colonial origins. See Holning Lau, 
The Language of Westernization in Legal Commentary, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2013). 
